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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 BANGUI 0676

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, CT, US
SUBJECT: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY & RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PART I

REF: CERP 001, STATE 038356

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF PART I OF THE PARM FOR THE CENTRAL
AFRICAN EMPIRE.

PART I - POLICY ASSESSMENT

A. US INTERESTS

THE CENTRAL AFRICAN EMPIRE IS A SMALL RELATIVELY ISOLATED COUNTRY
WHERE FEW DIRECT US INTERESTS IMPINGE. IT IS NOT OF MAJOR GEO-
POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE NOR ARE OUR EXISTING ECONOMIC INTERESTS
OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. WE DO, HOWEVER, HAVE A NUMBER OF GENERAL
AND SECONDARY INTERESTS OF WHICH THE MOST IMPORTANT ARE:

1. PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
IF OUR LIMITED DIRECT BILATERAL INTERESTS ARE TO BE PROTECTED
OVER THE LONG TERM AND IF OUR ECONOMIC PROGRAMS ARE TO BENEFIT
THE MASS OF CENTRAL AFRICANS, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE COUNTRY
MOVE TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, AS PROVIDED IN THE
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DECEMBER 1976 CONSTITUTION, AND TOWARD THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE HUMAN RIGHTS CLEARLY SET OUT THEREIN.

2. HUMANITARIAN CONCERN FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
THE CAE IS A RESOURCE POOR, AND EXTREMELY UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY
WITH A PER CAPITA INCOME OF LESS THAN \$200. AS IN OTHER COUNTRIES
OF THE THIRD WORLD WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN SEEING THAT THE COUNTRY

PROSPERS ECONOMICALLY TO THE BENEFIT OF THE VAST UNDERPRIVILEGED MAJORITY OF ITS CITIZENRY. IF THE CAE FAILS TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF DEVELOPMENT, (OR OF PROGRESS TO MORE OPEN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS) ECONOMIC COLLAPSE AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY ARE LIKELY WITH A CONCOMITANT DISRUPTIVE IMPACT ON OUR DIRECT BILATERAL INTERESTS.

3. THE MAINTENANCE OF CAE SUPPORT FOR US POSITIONS ON MAJOR INTERNATIONAL AND MULTILATERAL ISSUES WHERE WE HAVE HAD CONSISTENT SUPPORT IN THE PAST. THESE INCLUDE KOREA, PUERTO RICO, THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA. CONVERSELY WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN LIMITING SOVIET, EASTERN EUROPEAN AND RADICAL THIRD WORLD INFLUENCE ON THIS GOVERNMENT WHICH COULD LEAD TO A CHANGE IN ITS TRADITIONALLY MODERATE POSITIONS.

4. COMPETITIVE ACCESS TO CAE NATURAL RESOURCES:
ALREADY THE CAE HAS SEVERAL IMPORTANT EXPLOITABLE NATURAL RESOURCES INCLUDING WOOD, DIAMONDS AND URANIUM. THERE IS GOOD REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT THE CAE MAY BE RICH IN HEAVY METALS AND MAY HAVE PETROLEUM DEPOSITS. THESE WILL PROBABLY ONLY BE EXPLOITABLE OVER A LONG TIME FRAME, BUT WE HAVE AN INTEREST IN SEEING THAT THESE RESOURCES ARE NOT PREEMPTED BY OUTSIDE POWERS, PARTICULARLY THOSE HOSTILE TO US.

5. PROTECTION OF US CITIZEN INTERESTS
ALTHOUGH THERE IS LITTLE DIRECT US INVESTMENT (\$7 MILLION), MNNUAL TRADE IS LIMITED (\$8 MILLION ANNUAL TURNOVER) AND THE US POPULATION IS SMALL (APPROXIMATELY 350), WE HAVE AN ONGOING INTEREST IN SEEING THAT AMERICAN CITIZENS, INVESTORS AND CONFIDENTIAL

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TRADERS ARE PROTECTED, ARE NOT SUBJECT TO ARBITRARY OR DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT, AND RECEIVE PROMPT AND ADEQUATE PAYMENT FOR COMMERCIAL ENGAGEMENTS LEGITIMATELY ENTERED INTO.

B. OVERVIEW

1. WITH THE PROCLAMATION OF THE EMPIRE IN DECEMBER 1976, CENTRAL AFRICA ENTERED UPON A NEW ERA IN ITS RELATIVELY BRIEF HISTORY AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE. AFTER ELEVEN YEARS OF ARBITRARY ONE-MAN RULE, A NEW CONSTITUTION WAS PROMULGATED EXPLICITLY GUARANTEEING A WIDE RANGE OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND PLEDGED TO THE CREATION OF PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS AND A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION WILL BE ONE OF THE KEY FACTORS FOR THE FUTURE AND BENCHMARK AGAINST WHICH WE CAN MEASURE THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF BOKASSA'S RULE. THE FRAMEWORK FOR A POSITIVE EVOLUTION EXISTS; HOW (OR, INDEED, WHETHER) WE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO IT IS A MORE DIFFICULT QUESTION.

2. THE FUTURE VIABILITY OF THE "EMPIRE" WILL DEPEND ON A NUMBER

OF FACTORS: (A) BOKASSA'S ABILITY TO MANIPULATE POLITICAL FACTIONS AND ANTICIPATE AND UNDERCUT OPPOSITION; AND (B) THE DIRECTION OF THE ECONOMY. IF BOKASSA AVOIDS THE REPRESSIVE BRUTALITY OF THE EARLY 70'S (AND THERE ARE SIGNS OF A GREATER AWARENESS OF AND CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS), ALLOWS THE GRADUAL GROWTH OF SOME PARTICIPATORY INSTITUTIONS, SUCH AS THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AND RECONCILES HIS AFRICAN NEIGHBORS TO THE MUCH-RIDICULED IDEA OF IMPERIAL SOVEREIGNTY, HIS POLITICAL PROBLEMS MAY BE MANAGEABLE. SIMILARLY, EFFORTS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY TO INCREASE PRODUCTION OF THE COUNTRY'S BASIC COMMODITIES, COFFEE, COTTON AND TOBACCO, AND TO SHARE THE BENEFITS OF THESE INCREASES WITH THE RURAL AND URBAN POOR, IF SUCCESSFUL, WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE CREATION OF AN ATMOSPHERE WITHIN WHICH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CAN TAKE PLACE AND TRADE AND INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES PROSPER.

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3. IT IS OF COURSE BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT EVENTS WILL EVOLVE IN SUCH A POSITIVE WAY. IN RECENT YEARS DISSATISFACTION HAS BEEN ON THE RISE WITH BOKASSA'S HIGHLY PERSONAL RULING STYLE, AND A MORE RELAXED ATMOSPHERE MAY ENCOURAGE EXPRESSION OF THAT DISSATISFACTION. THE SLUGGISH PERFORMANCE OF THE ECONOMY, AGGRAVATED BY SOME OF THE WASTEFUL AND CAPRICIOUS DECISIONS OF THE NATION'S LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF CONTINUING CONCERN.

4. BOKASSA, HOWEVER, HAS SHOWN REMARKABLE STAYING POWER, AND HE DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE LOST HIS MANIPULATIVE SKILLS. THERE ARE HOPEFUL SIGNS THAT THE COUNTRY IS MOVING AWAY FROM THE DISASTROUS POLICIES OF RECENT YEARS. THE NEW COUNCIL OF MINISTERS CONTAINS MANY ABLE TECHNOCRATS BENT ON ACCELERATING DEVELOPMENT IN THEIR AREAS OF COMPETENCE. IN ADDITION,

THE SHORT TERM ECONOMIC PROGNOSIS FOR THE COUNTRY IS MORE PROMISING THAN BEFORE. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IS UP, AS ARE WORLD MARKET PRICES FOR SEVERAL OF THE CAE'S KEY EXPORTS (COFFEE AND DIAMONDS FOR EXAMPLE) AND THERE IS GREATER PRAGMATISM IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THE ECONOMY. ALL OF THIS HAS CONTRIBUTED TO A MODEST OPTIMISM AMONG LONG TIME OBSERVERS. THUS, DESPITE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE EMPIRE, THERE SEEMS TO BE A REASONABLE CHANCE THAT WE WILL HAVE A POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH TO WORK OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS.

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OUR TASK WILL BE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS POSITIVE EVOLUTION THROUGH CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND A CAREFUL POLITICAL STRATEGY DESIGNED TO MOVE BOKASSA TOWARDS FURTHER LIBERALIZATION OF THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM.

5. ALSO OF SOME IMPORTANCE FROM THE AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW WILL BE THE POSITION OF THE CAE ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. IN RECENT YEARS BOKASSA HAS BEEN A SELF-CONSCIOUSLY STAUNCH FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES, SUPPORTING US IN ANGOLA, VOTING WITH US ON A WIDE RANGE OF WORLD ISSUES SUCH AS KOREA AND THE MIDDLE EAST, AND RESPONSIVE TO OUR REQUESTS FOR INTERVENTION IN SITUATIONS WHERE WE BELIEVE HIM TO HAVE INFLUENCE (UGANDA). ALTHOUGH HE HAS MOVED IN RECENT MONTHS TO DIVERSIFY HIS EXTERNAL RELATIONS TO INCLUDE COUNTRIES MORE TOWARD THE RADICAL END OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM (PEKING, NORTH KOREA, LIBYA), HE HAS REPEATEDLY STRESSED HIS COMMITMENT TO WESTERN POSITIONS, HIS ADMIRATION FOR THE US, AND HIS DESIRE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH US. HE HAS ALSO RETAINED HIS INFORMAL TIES WITH ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA. ONE OF OUR MAJOR TASKS IN THE FUTURE WILL BE TO MAXIMIZE HIS SUPPORT FOR OUR INTERESTS.

6. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP, WE WILL HAVE TO SHOW A CONCERN FOR BOKASSA'S PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND A RECOGNITION FOR HIS SUPPORT TO US. THIS CONCERN DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE SHOULD ENGAGE IN ANY COMPETITIVE ATTEMPT TO OUTBID OTHER DONORS. NOR SHOULD WE THINK THAT OUR INVOLVEMENT WILL GIVE US PARTICULAR LEVERAGE OVER INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS, SINCE OUR INVOLVEMENT WILL STILL BE FAR LESS THAN THAT OF THE FRENCH. WHAT WILL BE NEEDED ON OUR PART IS EVIDENCE OF A SUSTAINED COMMITMENT TO THE ALLEVIATION OF THE CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS OF THE COUNTRY, PARTICULARLY "DISENCLAVEMENT," HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT, AND AGRICULTURAL GROWTH. WE SHALL ALSO HAVE TO DEVISE A WAY TO MEET HIS CURRENT IMPERIAL PREOCCUPATIONS: THE CORONATION AND A VISIT TO WASHINGTON. THE LEVEL OF OUR REPRESENTATION AT THE FORMER AND THE NATURE OF THE PROGRAM

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FOR THE LATTER WILL HAVE SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE, SURPASSING THEIR INTRINSIC SIGNIFICANCE, AS BOKASSA DECIDES HOW FAR IT IS IN HIS INTEREST TO MAINTAIN THE EXISTING COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH US. IF WE SUCCEED, AND WE HAVE THE TOOLS AT OUR DISPOSAL TO DO SO, OUR LIMITED INTERESTS WILL BE SERVED AND A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP ACHIEVED.

C. OBJECTIVES, COURSES OF ACTION AND ISSUES

1. ENCOURAGE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION

COURSES OF ACTION

A. INDICATE TO BOKASSA AND OTHER SENIOR LEADERS OUR AWARENESS OF AND CONCERN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION.

B. SHOW OUR APPROVAL IF AND WHEN BOKASSA IMPLEMENTS THE DEMOCRATIC REFORMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS GUARANTEES CONTAINED IN THE CONSTITUTION AND MAKE CLEAR IN CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM THE FACT THAT WE ARE WATCHING CLOSELY THE PERFORMANCE OF ALL GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING HIS OWN IN THIS REGARD.

C. ENCOURAGE LINKS TO DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS (E.G., THE PARLIAMENT) AS THEY ARE ESTABLISHED.

D. REFRAIN FROM INVOLVEMENT WITH ELEMENTS OF THE GOCAE MOST CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE SECURITY APPARATUS.

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Z. BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF BOKASSA'S ADVISERS THE BAD PRESS BOKASSA CONTINUES TO GET IN THE UNITED STATES AS A RESULT OF PAST EXCESSES.

ISSUES

ALTHOUGH OF GREAT LONG-TERM IMPORTANCE, WE HAVE VIRTUALLY NO CONTROL OVER DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS AREA. GREATER DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM COULD RESULT IN UNREST AND/OR THREATS TO BOKASSA. IF SO, HE WILL MOVE TO REIMPOSE TIGHT CONTROLS. IN THAT CASE THE MOST WE CAN HOPE FOR IS THAT HE WILL NOT AGAIN RESORT TO THE PUBLIC BRUTAILITY AND TORTURE OF THE EARLY 1970'S. AT THE MOMENT HE IS UNDOUBTEDLY ATTUNED TO OUR CONCERNS AS A RESULT OF WIDESPREAD INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES. WE SHOULD MOVE TO EXPLOIT THIS AWARENESS AS OCCASIONS PRESENT THEMSELVES.

2. PROMOTE THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAE THROUGH PROJECTS FOCUSSED ON THE DISADVANTAGED RURAL MASSES AND ON THE EXPLOITATION OF THE COUNTRY'S BASIC RESOURCES.

COURSES OF ACTION

A. CONTINUE AID AND PEACE CORPS PROGRAMS UNDERWAY OR PLANNED
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IN THE FIELDS OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND AGRICULTURE, CONSISTENT WITH THE LIMITD ABSORBTIVE CAPACITY OF THE COUNTRY. THE OBJECTIVE FOR AID SHOULD BE NEW OBLIGATIONS OF \$1-2 MILLION A YEAR.

B. INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF TRAINIG PROVIDED TO CAE CITIZENS IN AREAS FUNDAMENTAL TO DEVELOPMENT.

C. PARTICIPATE IN A MINERALS SURVEY OF THE COUNTRY WHICH WOULD USE OUR UNIQUE TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY (SATELLITE MAPPING, AEROMAGNETIC SURVEYS) AND WOULD SET THE STAGE FOR EXPLOITATION BY PRIVATE COMPANIES (SEE ALSO E BELOW). (MINERAL DEVELOPMENT OFFERS VIRTUALLY THE ONLY LONG-TERM BASIS ON WHICH THE CAE CAN GENERATE RESOURCES FOR EXTENSIVE ECONOMIC ADVANCEMENT AND PUT AN END TO ITS EXISTING CLIENT STATE RELATIONS TO OUTSIDE POWERS. THE PROPOSED SURVEY WILL ENHANCE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT WE CAN HAVE REASONABLE COMMERCIAL ACCESS TO ANY MINERALS DISCOVERED.)

D. CONSIDER PARTICIPATION IN INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE CAE'S ACCESS TO THE SEA AND THE

ELIMINATION OF INTERNAL COMMUNICATION BOTTLENECKS. SUCH PARTICIPATION MIGHT EVENTUALLY INCLUDE US JOINING WITH THE FED AND THE IDA IN SOME ASPECT OF AN ALL-WEATHER ROAD LINK BETWEEN THE CAE AND CAMEROON.

ISSUES

THE GOCAE'S ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITY IS SUCH THAT IT HAS DIFFICULTY: A) PREPARING AID PROJECTS; B) SUPPORTING THE PROJECTS; AND C) OPERATING AND MAINTAINING THEM ONCE THE AID ENDS. THESE LIMITATIONS PUT A HEAVY BURDEN ON THE USG TO DESIGN PROJECTS WHICH CAN OPERATE INDEPENDENTLY OF SHORT-TERM GOCAE SUPPORT, AND IT RESTRICTS THE AMOUNT OF MONEY WHICH CAN BE SPENT EFFECTIVELY IN THE FIELDS MANDATED BY CONGRESS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO FOCUS OUR EFFORTS AS CLEARLY AS POSSIBLE
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TO AVOID FRITTERING AWAY RESOURCES AND TO MAXIMIZE OUR IMPACT ON THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS.

3. OBTAIN GOCAE SUPPORT ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO US, INCLUDING KOREA, MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA, PUERTO RICO.

COURSES OF ACTION

A. CONTINUE OUR PROGRAM OF DEMARCHES AT ALL LEVELS, PARTICULARLY WITH THE EMPEROR, TO ALERT THE GOCAE TO SALIENT ISSUES AND TO REINFORCE ITS EXISTING MODERATE TENDENCIES.

B. PROVIDE DOCUMENTATION IN FRENCH FOR OUR POSITIONS (REQUIRES DEPARTMENT TO TRANSMIT FRENCH AIDE MEMOIRES FOR ALL DEMARCHES).

C. GIVE EVIDENCE OF CONTINUED INTEREST IN THE COUNTRY THROUGH ONGOING AID AND USIS ACTIVITIES. (AID IN PARTICULAR IS SEEN BY THE GOCAE AS A QUID PRO QUO FOR ITS POLITICAL SUPPORT AND IT ALLOWS THE EMBASSY ACCESS TO A WIDER RANGE OF OFFICIALS THAN WOULD OTHERWISE BE THE CASE.)

D. ENCOURAGE OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES TO CONTINUE THEIR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ON THESE ISSUES AND COUNTRIES SUCH AS SOUTH KOREA AND ISRAEL TO INCREASE THEIR AID TO THE COUNTRY.

ISSUES

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RENEWED REPRESSION AND BRUTALITY BY THE BOKASSA REGIME WOULD JEOPARDIZE OUR ABILITY TO CONTINUE AID AND COULD EASILY RESULT IN PUBLIC EXCHANGES WHICH WOULD LIMIT OUR ABILITY TO MAKE OUR VIEWS KNOWN ON ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO US. THE GOC AE MIGHT STILL SUPPORT OUR POSITION ON ISSUES SUCH AS KOREA, THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA, BUT AS A RESULT OF PRESSURES FROM COUNTRIES OTHER THAN THE US. IN ADDITION A MAJOR AND SUSTAINED INCREASE IN SOVIET, CHINESE OR ARAB ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE MIGHT ALSO RESULT IN A SHIFT IN CENTRAL AFRICAN POLICY ON ONE OR MORE ISSUES IMPORTANT TO US.

4. LIMIT THE INFLUENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COMMUNIST POWERS

COURSES OF ACTION

A. ENCOURAGE FRANCE, WHICH OVERSHADOWS ALL OTHER FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE DONORS IN THE GOC AE, OTHER COUNTRIES SUCH AS CANADA AND GERMANY, AND INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WITH FRANCOPHONE CAPABILITY, TO MAINTAIN THEIR AID PROGRAMS.

B. ENCOURAGE THE CAE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE RELATIONS WITH MODERATE AFRICAN LEADERS SUCH AS MOBUTU AND HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY.
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C. MAINTAIN USIS & PEACE CORPS PROGRAMS IN ENGLISH TEACHING AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS WHICH OFFER ACCESS TO ANOTHER WESTERN CULTURE FOR THOSE CENTRAL AFRICANS WHO WISH TO EXPAND THEIR

HORIZONS BEYOND FRANCE AND THE SOVIET UNION.

D. IF REQUESTED, BRIEF THE EMPEROR AS APPROPRIATE ON CURRENT SOVIET STRATEGY AND PROGRAMS IN AFRICA.

ISSUES

SO FAR THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT CALCULATED THAT THE CAE IS WORTH HEAVY FINANCIAL INPUTS. IT HAS CONCENTRATED ON TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND LONG-TERM TRAINING WHICH HAVE HAD ONLY A LIMITED IMPACT. HOWEVER, SHOULD THE SOVIET UNION DECIDE TO MOUNT A SUSTAINED EXPENSIVE EFFORT, THIS WOULD HAVE AN EFFECT OVER TIME AND COULD RESULT IN THE CAE'S ADOPTING A MORE RADICAL POSTURE.

5. PROMOTE US TRADE AND INVESTMENT

COURSES OF ACTION

A. CONTINUE TO PRESS THE GOCAE ACTION TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING COMMERCIAL DISPUTES:

1. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DEBT-RESCHEDULING AGREEMENT WITH EXIM.

2. NEGOTIATION OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE WITH THE AMERICAN DIAMOND FIRM OPERATING IN THE CAE.

3. NEGOTIATION OF A SETTLEMENT FOR THE NATIONALIZATION OF TEXACO AND MOBIL ASSETS IN THE CAE.

B. STRESS TO THE GOCAE THE IMPORTANCE OF EQUITABLE TREATMENT
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OF US TRADERS AND INVESTORS.

C. ENCOURAGE US MANUFACTURERS TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN BIDDING UNDER MULTILATERAL AID PROJECTS IN THE CAE.

D. FOLLOW UP ON OUR COMMERCIAL OUTREACH EFFORTS.

E. DEVELOP A JOINT USAID-UNDP MINERALS RESOURCES SURVEY PROJECT WHICH WILL INCREASE ACCESS OF AMERICAN COMPANIES TO INFORMATION ABOUT GOCAE NATURAL RESOURCES.

ISSUES

PRODDED BY THE EMBASSY, THE GOCAE MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TOWARD RESOLVING OUTSTANDING COMMERCIAL DISPUTES WITH THE US IN 1976. CONTINUED PRODDING WILL BE NECESSARY,

ALTHOUGH PROBABLY AT A LOWER LEVEL. HOWEVER, THE GOCAE STILL DOES NOT REALIZE HOW MUCH EMPHASIS WE PUT ON PRIVATE INVESTMENT, PARTICULARLY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, AND THE NEED TO ADHERE TO PAST AGREEMENTS IF IT WISHES TO ATTRACT MORE INVESTMENT.

6. DEVELOP BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE US AMONG CENTRAL AFRICAN ELITES

COURSES OF ACTION

A. MODERATELY EXPAND OUR INFORMATION AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE INCREASED ACCESSIBILITY TO CENTRAL AFRICANS FOR SUCH EFFORTS.

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B. CONTINUE AN ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEACHING PROGRAM AT THE USIS CULTURAL CENTER AND THE PROVISION OF MATERIALS FOR PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEERS TEACHING ENGLISH IN THE CAE.

C. SUPPLEMENT AID SCHOLARSHIPS WITH CONTINUED INTERNATIONAL VISITOR GRANTS FOR CENTRAL AFRICAN ENGLISH TEACHERS, JOURNALISTS AND PROMISING OFFICIALS.

D. PROVIDE A FULBRIGHT PROFESSOR TO THE UNIVERSITY WHOSE EXPERTISE COINCIDES WITH THE UNIVERSITY'S REQUIREMENTS.

E. ENCOURAGE A SISTER-CITY RELATIONSHIP FOR BANGUI.

ISSUES

ALWAYS RECEPTIVE TO AID PROGRAMS, THE CAE HAS RECENTLY BECAME MORE OPEN TO AMERICAN CULTURAL AND INFORMATION PROGRAMS AS WELL. SINCE THESE PROGRAMS SERVE OTHER PURPOSES AS WELL (SEE OBJECTIVE A ABOVE), A MODEST EXPANSION INCLUDING THE ASSIGNMENT OF A FULL-TIME PAO IS JUSTIFIED.

7. HANDLE BOKASSA'S IMPERIAL ASPIRATIONS IN WAYS WHICH REINFORCE THE OTHER POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP.

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COURSES OF ACTION

A. SEND A SPECIAL EMISSARY OR DELEGATION TO BOKASSA'S CORONATION LATER IN 1977 INCLUDING IF POSSIBLE ON SENIOR OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS.

B. MAKE TENTATIVE PLANS FOR BOKASSA TO MAKE AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN 1978.

C. STRESS TO THE EMPEROR WELL IN ADVANCE THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WISHES TO AVOID ALL OSTENTATIOUS CEREMONY AND THAT A FULL STATE VISIT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE.

ISSUES

THE EMPEROR HAS WANTED TO VISIT THE U.S. FOR A LONG TIME AND WHITE HOUSE CALLS WERE ALMOST ARRANGED IN TWO PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS. BOKASSA SEES THE VISIT AS SYMBOLIZING THE CLOSE POLITICAL SUPPORT HE HAS GIVEN US IN RECENT YEARS. ASSUMING CONTINUED POLITICAL SUPPORT AND SOME PROGRESS TOWARD THE CREATION OF A MORE OPEN AND LIBERAL SYSTEM IN THE CAE, IT WOULD BE IN OUR INTEREST TO ARRANGE A LOW-KEY VISIT IN 1978. WE WILL NOT BE UNDER ANY PRESSURE TO RESPOND UNTIL AFTER THE CORONATION IN LATE 1977, BUT BY THEN WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO BE MORE PRECISE ABOUT A POSSIBLE VISIT.

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Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2851212
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY & RESOURCE ASSESSMENT - PART I
TAGS: AMGT, PFOR, CT, US
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/bd60bca7-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
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EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
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